Regulatory decisions made by OSHA
[Occupational Safety and Health Administrationl involve issues of life and health, and thus are inevitably among the most emotion laden issues dealt with by governments. The interests contending over government occupational safety and health policy, organized labor, and business are among the best organized in society, which makes these questions among the most difficult to resolve politically. And the achievement of compliance with OSHA regulations, once issued, by the millions of firms subject to them exemplifies the most difficult problems governments face. For these reasons, the experience with OSHA gives us a good, if larger than life, view of the most difficult problems of policy making in American society today-and tracking OSHA's future provides a good way of tracking how government is dealing with some of the harder domestic policy issues it faces (Kelman, 1980) . O SH A attracts a lot of attention but minimal support for its performance. The agency is chronically justifying its activity amid the tides of party politics, economic competition, or corporate misconduct. Some scholars argue that much of the agency's effort is consumed by this defensive posture (Bryner, 1987; Meier, 1985) . Other policy analysts look unfavorably on OSHA because they believe regulation is a costly and ineffective approach to health and safety in the workplace (Smith, 1976; Viscusi, 1983) . And with the recessionary economy, this view has won more acceptance. Yet other crit-Tracking OSHA's future provides a good way of tracking how government is dealing with some of the harder domestic policy issues it faces.
ics say that it is precisely the deregulatory sentiment that has OSHA drowning in a sea of debate without sufficient resources for rescue (Gerston, 1988; Noble, 1986) . This article reviews the major institutional problems that have plagued OSHA from its inception in relation to the agency's current policy initiatives. The assumption is that OSHA's future success will be predicated on how well these new initiatives overcome the problems of the past.
The discussion begins with an analysis of the movement to deregulate industry: When did deregulation become the fever? How and why was it implemented? What was the effect for OSHA? Next, the problems with OSHA rule making are reviewed along with current OSHA policies to circumvent them. This discussion is followed by a look at the politics and practice of enforcement procedures, yesterday and today. Finally, some conclusions for the future are drawn by examining the promise of OSHA's new policies to rectify past problems.
THE DEREGULATORY
MOVEMENT Many liberal minded OSHA proponents blame conservative administrations since the 1980s for OSHA's problems. These authors associate OSHA's meager standard setting and enforcement power-low fines, a limited inspection program, and few health standards-with the conservative push to deregulate industry (Noble, 1986; Simon, 1983) .
As a sign of OSHA's weakness, Serrin ("The Wages of Work," The Nation, January 28, 1991) points to the slashing of OSHA's budget during the Reagan/Bush years-"adjusted for inflation, the current annual budget of 285.2 million is less than it was in 1970."
But the move to deregulate industry is not simply a matter of political philosophy-conservative ideology. If this were true, OSHA would never have been created during the Nixon years, a Republican administration. Furthermore, even though the Reagan administration is generally credited with dismantling OSHA, regulatory relief programs were part of the Carter years (Executive Order 12.044, Regulatory Analysis and Re-view Group and Council on Wage and Price Stability, 1983) .
According to Szasz (1986) , health and safety deregulation occurred not only because of political forces, but also because of the social and economic climate. Social impediments to regulation, discussed more fully in the following sections, were interference with OSHA rule making and enforcement by Congress, the courts, the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC), and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Bureaucratic entanglement is blamed for stifling OSHA's progress, reinforcing the position that regulation is tedious, time consuming, ineffective, and therefore, unnecessary.
The economic picture of the early OSHA years contributed to the lack of support for regulation (Szasz, 1984) . The oil crisis of the mid 1970s and economic hard times prompted business to postpone as many costs as possible in the short term. In this climate, any regulation seemed unduly harsh or burdensome. With business on its back, government was inclined to accommodate these interests. Consequently, the feeling that any regulation is unfair, and should be contested, continues today despite changing economics.
With the contextual socioeconomic features to regulatory resistance forgotten, Szasz (1986) argues that regulatory policy has become inextricably linked to economic devastation, so much so that OSHA is blamed for the economy's stagnation. Similarly, industry repeatedly cites overregulation as the reason for plant closings (Berman, 1978) . This argument ignores admissions by leading OSHA opponents that OSHA has not had a significant inflationary impact (Szasz, 1986) . Nonetheless, downsizing government, as a way to compete in the global economy, has become more accepted.
Arguments supporting deregulation generally ignore the international experience of occupational safety and health regulation and the case for technological innovation as a From OSHA's beginning, the public has viewed rule making with skepticism and cynicism.
result of regulation. The fact that social governments, more stringently regulated than the United States, are holding respectable positions in the international market is overlooked (Elling, 1986) . In addition, regulation can result in innovative technology and ultimately drive competition (Engaas, 1989) . Engaas examines the examples of 3M and the Norwegian firm Elkem, in which innovation was actually stimulated by regulation. The picture of OSHA as "no good and not needed" resonates with conservative ideology. Conservative philosophy maintains that goods and services-including health and safety-are exchanged more efficiently in an open market, without government regulation. These ideological arguments obscure the real reasons why regulation was averted in the first place. Hence, the assumptions of the deregulatory movement-that government interference devastated the economy and that OSHA regulations are superfluous and ineffectual-go unchallenged.
Continued acceptance of this perspective fosters a lack of faith in the agency. So too, the belief that OSHA "just can't get it right," independent of other factors, continues to haunt the agency-regardless who is in the driver's seat, conservative or liberal.
Just how a lack of faith in the agency has thwarted OSHA efforts can be understood in terms of rule making and compliance activities.
THE RULE MAKING PROCESS:
RIGHTS AND RITUALS From OSHA's beginning, the public has viewed rule making with skepticism and cynicism. The sentiment followed OSHA's early adoption of consensus standards in its first 90 days, without adequate review of them. Many of the standards were antiquated, trivial or vague, redundant, and contradictory (Gerston, 1988) . Nothing could have marred OSHA's reputation more than these. One standard restricted ice in drinking water since, in the 1800s, ice was claimed from lakes, and some lakes were polluted. Another standard required toilet seats to be split in the front. Unfortunately for OSHA, as the saying goes, first impressions are lasting ones.
Image problem aside, rule making success is affected by the games OSHA must play. In the following discussion, they are referred to as "To Tell the Truth," "Red Rover, Red Rover," and "Blind Man's Bluff"
Sorting the Evidence for Rule
Making The OSHA rule making process is laborious and cumbersome, but designed this way to allow all interested parties to be heard-no matter how valid their comments. In this regard, the process reminds one of the game show; "To Tell the Truth." In this game, the contestants get up and tell their respective stories and a panel decides what information is actually correct. But the similarities end there. On the show; contestants are limited to three, only oral arguments are acceptable, and the contestants have just one chance to tell their stories. No such conditions exist for OSHA.
The conditions for OSHA rule making are spelled out in the statutory provisions. They include: a petition for rule making from individuals or groups, NIOSH (National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health), public officials, or within OSHA; advanced notice of proposed rule making; public comment period; notice of proposed rule making; public comment period; public hearing; post hearing comment period; and posting of the final rule. Shapiro (1989) has discussed why OSHA's rule making is particularly burdensome, more than other regula-tory agencies. Even though all health and safety agencies must use some form of public process in rule making, OSHA has a more stringent interpretation about what this means. Rather than just informal comment, OSHA must hold hearings in which interested parties can cross examine key witnesses.
In addition, OSHA must submit "substantial evidence" to support its rules (Bryner, 1987) . The substantial evidence is made more unwieldy by the requirement to justify evidence in light of comments collected in the rule making process. Furthermore, different from agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration, where a prospective licensee is the proponent and has the burden of proof, OSHA is the proponent of its rules and the burden rests with the agency.
Hence, for OSHA, sorting out the truth is a time consuming, difficult, and defensive task. An appreciation for OSHA's trials can be understood better by an examination of the contested terrain.
OSHA's Weak Links
OSHA's power has been tested repeatedly, like the strength of the human chain in a game of Red Rover. In this game, opponents attempt to break the strength of the defendants by charging headstrong into the weak links of a knitted arm chain. Business, labor, Congress, the courts, and the White House launched a charge against OSHA at the weak links in the agency.
The attack against OSHA was notable, if not predictable. In the first year of the agency, approximately 100 bills were introduced in Congress to amend or repeal the OSH Act (Thompson, 1982) . The dispute pitched the rights of workers against those of employers. Some authors see the contest as unavoidable, a zero sum game: "any decision that significantly affects the worker interests will just as significantly affect employer interests in the opposite direction" (Shapiro, 1989) . Kelman (1980) defines the politi-For OSHA, sorting out the truth is a time consuming, difficult, and defensive task.
cal controversy as a matter of concentrated effects: costs to industry and benefits to workers. Under such conditions, the affected parties are motivated to organize and fight their case through all available means. One arena for the fight has been Congress. Lawmakers, pressed by interests, have questioned the authority of OSHA to distribute effects (costs and benefits). In 1976, Congress approved legislation that stripped OSHA of its regulatory authority over farms with 10 or fewer employees (Gerston, 1988) . In 1977, Congress attached an amendment to the appropriations bill requiring OSHA to rescind "nuisance standards."
In 1979, a Senate proposal expanded the firms exempt from OSHA inspections--estimated to be 37% of the nation's workplaces. However, labor mobilized to defeat the bill. When Congressional interest in OSHA died, OSHA's authority was challenged on another front. Ironically, in 1985, Congress joined labor and public interests groups in contesting the interference of the OMB in the promulgation of OSHA standards (Bryner, 1987) .
OMB review has not only slowed the rule making process but changed it. Under President Reagan, OMB was formally, yet indirectly, appointed OSHA watchdog. According to Executive Order, all proposed standards were to be submitted to OMB for cost/benefit analysis and approval (Executive Order No. 12.291.3CFR 127, 1981) . Bryner (1987) noted that at least four of OSHA's proposed and final standards had been rewritten in response to OMB criticisms. Most interestingly, OMB's yardstick-cost/benefit analysis-is specifically prohib-McNeely ited by the courts as grounds for rejecting OSHA standards. ' * The courts have been another battleground for OSHA. Almost every health standard has been contested in the courts (Bryner, 1987) . This has led to long delays in rule making. For example, after spending a decade working on the benzene standard, the courts rejected OSHA's rule because the agency failed to demonstrate a significant health risk relative to the recommended permissible exposure level (Thompson, 1982) .
This decision set a precedent for the development of future health standards. Because of the paucity of scientific evidence for the health effects of chemicals, OSHA now assumes a tremendous resource burden in establishing proof In the case of benzene, OSHA's search for proof was limited by a virtual scientific blindfold.
The Problem of Insufficient Data
For OSHA, the problem of operating in a blindfold, without sufficient data, is far from over. For all practical purposes, OSHA is caught in a game of Blind Man's Bluf£ Robinson (1991) reviewed the mixed messages in four different OSHA policies pertaining to carcinogens and found a consistent risk management strategy was lacking. The policies differed significantly in three ways. First, the acceptance of animal or epidemiologic evidence varied. Second, it was uncertain whether the exposure limit should be set at the Threshold Limit Value (TLV) or a lower limit. And finally, given the overwhelming uncertainty of the evidence, recommended exposure levels from a number of research groups were introduced, despite the conflicting overriding risk assessment frameworks.
Many were disturbed about the deference of OSHA to American Conference of Governmental Indus-"In the cotton dust decision, the court concluded that it was the intention of Congress, in the drafting of the OSH Act, to place the benefit of worker health above all other considerations.
trial Hygienists (ACGIH) standards over NIOSH recommendations in the new Air Contaminants Standard (Robinson, 1991) . This is true despite the OSH Act specification of NIOSH as OSHA's research body. Furthermore, ACGIH levels are generally established at levels reported as prevalent in industry rather than below the level at which significant health effects occur. Robinson (1991) notes: "The TLV-based PELs (Permissible Exposure Limits) for 98 substances in the Air Contaminants Standard were considered insufficiently protective by NIOSH."
OSHA'S ANSWERS TO RULE
MAKING SNARLS OSHA has a number of means to affect rule making problems: consensus building techniques; generic standards; voluntary guidelines; performance based standards; and information strategies.
Consensus building techniques include mediated rule making and the use of advisory committees. Both of these approaches attempt to bring together interested parties while rules are being formulated to avoid protest at later stages. OSHA used mediated rule making for the proposal on 4,4-methyleneduaniline (MDA) (McMillan, 1989) .
Generic rules, covering broad categories of hazards, eliminate the substance by substance approach, and hasten the process of rule making. The poor acceptance of OSHA's generic cancer policy did not bode well for the approach (Robinson, 1991) . Similarly, the Hazard Communication Standard, another generic policy, took 13 years from conception to promulgation (McNeely, 1990 ).
Yet, with increasing public familiarity, generic rule making holds great promise for its expediency potential.
In one rule, the Air Contaminants
Standard, 164 new substances were regulated and exposure to an addi-tional212 substances, previously regulated, were lowered (54 Fed Register.2332 Register. , 1989 . The proposed generic exposure monitoring and medical surveillance are examples of future, similar efforts to create more broad based standards (53 Fed Register.32591, 32595, 1988) .
To gain cooperation from business and to swiftly establish safe practices, OSHA has turned to voluntary guidelines such as "Safety and Health Program Management Guidelines" (54 Fed Register. 3904, 1989) . These guidelines may serve to confer acceptance of future rules or, at the very least, to disseminate conventional knowledge.
Performance standards allow employers to choose a unique approach to hazard reduction. Employers can design a risk management plan that fits the company and the budget, as long as the desired outcomes are achieved. The Hazard Communication Rule is an example of a performance oriented standard (29 CFR 1910 (29 CFR .1200 . While the rule specifies that workers must know the hazards to which they are exposed, the method of training rests with the individual employer.
Finally, in lieu of definitive scientific evidence for rule making, standards mandating worker training about hazards provide workers with knowledge, even when risk information is equivocal. Workers can be protected by learning adequate work practices and possible health effects. More than a generic rule and a performance based standard, the Hazard Communication Rule embodies the goal of information strategies (29 CFR 1910 (29 CFR .1200 .
ENFORCEMENT: DOING THE JOB IN HANDCUFFS
The irony of an on-duty policeman in handcuffs is easier to recognize than the ties that bind OSHA's enforcement activities. Even so, the metaphor speaks to how each is restrained by its own enforcement devices.
OSHA's hands are tied by an inspection program limited in scope and force. OSHA can inspect only 2% of the nation's workplaces in any 1 year (Council on Occupational and Environmental Health, 1988) . Some critics have noted that there are more park rangers than OSHA inspectors (National Safe Workplace Institute, 1988) and that "the typical establishment will see an inspector once every 77 years, about as often as we see Halley's Comet" (Smith, 1976) . Viscusi (1983) calculated the chance of being inspected at 1 in 100. At any rate, the threat of inspection is minor.
Given the low odds of inspection, OSHA uses other surveillance mechanisms to keep a pulse on the industrial scene. OSHA can track company occupational injury and illness experience, through the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Survey and the OSHA 200 Log. These records are integral to compliance operations; so much so that OSHA was scrutinized in the early 80s for its "paper exemption" or records-only policies.
Paper exemptions refer to OSHA's former practice of foregoing worksite inspections when company logs demonstrated a low incidence of injury and illness. The AFL-CIO reported that "nearly 50% of the general scheduled visits to manufacturing firms in fiscal year 1982 were merely reviews of paper records, not workplace inspections" (Gerston, 1988) .
The records-only policy drew much criticism, not the least of which was the perverse incentive for companies not to report incidents. Moreover, the information on the logs was considered too vague to pinpoint problems. The debate finally exploded with the discovery of fraudulent company records (National Safe Workplace Institute, 1990). Subsequently, OSHA's enforcement priorities included a crackdown on records. But even so, this attention was limited to the companies OSHA was able to inspect. And while OSHA may no longer be using records to exempt firms from inspection, these records still provide benchmarks for problems in industry.
Effective enforcement is further diminished by small penalties. OSHA's record on trivial fines is especially striking when considering serious violations. For example, a $108,000 fine was assessed to a West Virginia firm when a cooling tower collapsed and killed 51 workers (Meier, 1985) . A company was penalized $16,200 after a man was killed in an industrial dryer (Lewis, D. "Is it time to revamp OSHA?" Boston Globe, July 5, 1991) . In addition, fines can be discounted further in negotiations between OSHA and the company.
Small penalties are not the only reason OSHA enforcement suffers. Companies can appeal OSHA citations to an independent board, the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC). The Commission's power is remarkable in its ability to set precedents. Even if a federal appeals court overturns a ruling of OSHRC, the court ruling is only binding in that circuit (Bureau of National Affairs, 1988) .
The problem between OSHA and OSHRC is one of a split-enforcement arrangement: "A recent study for the Administrative Conference of the United States found that the split-enforcement arrangement creates unnecessary conflicts because Congress failed to specify which agency should prevail when disagreements arise" (Shapiro, 1989) . And disagreements do arise, such as in the interpretation of general duty clause violations.* In summary, OSHA's enforcement capabilities are compromised, or one might say, arrested, by handcuffs.
RETRENCHMENT OF OSHA'S ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES
OSHA has fortified enforcement efforts primarily through increased fines, better control and definition of record keeping requirements, and more targeted inspections.
Improved penalties are now possible since Congress enacted new maximum limits for violations to the Occupational Safety and Health Act (ProHealth Alert, 1991a) . According to the Omnibus Budget Reconcilia-*Thegeneral duty clause of the aSH Actstates that an employer must keep the workplace free from recognizedhazards.
OSHA'S use of voluntary guidelines, as opposed to mandated rules, dismisses the underlying potential conflict of interest between business needs and individuals' needs for health and safety.
tion Act of 1990, beginning November 5, 1990, OSHA is allowed to levy up to $70,000 in civil fines for each willful or repeated violation (increased from $10,000) and $7,000 for 62 of each serious or other than serious violation (increased from $1,000). Currently, bills introduced in Congress would permit criminal penalties for employers who willfully cause bodily harm to workers. If passed, criminal penalties will up the ante for ignoring OSHA regulations.
OSHA has established a new Office of Recordkeeping and Data Analysis. The transfer of recordkeeping responsibilities from the Bureau of Labor Statistics to OSHA is an attempt to ensure more precise and consistent occupational illness and injury reporting. The Office will support OSHA compliance activities by preparing guidelines on recordkeeping for employers and by maintaining the data base of injury and illness experience (ProHealth Alert, 1991b) .
Given the limited OSHA inspection personnel, targeted evaluations of high risk industries continue to be an essential feature to the compliance program. Known as Special Emphasis Programs (SEP), these inspections follow priorities established by either standard-setting activities such as hazard communication and blood borne pathogens, or safety concerns such as ergonomic risks in the meat packing industry or fatalities in the petrochemical industry.
McNeely

CONCLUSION: OSHA INTO THE 90s
How will OSHA navigate the troubled waters of rule makingnamely, the laborious process, contested power, and insufficient information? The barometers of success will be: consensus building techniques, generic standards, performance based standards, voluntary guidelines, and information strategies.
But these strategies have problems. For example, reliance on information strategies to protect workers ignores the realities of limited options and choices for workers who may face exposure or unemployment. In addition, information may be difficult to use in light of poor data for risk calculation.
Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS), the main source of chemical hazard information, are often confusing and incomplete, although OSHA is currently working to standardize the content and format of the MSDS. Yet, with an increasingly diverse and illiterate work force, the technical language of the MSDS, communicated in English, will be meaningless regardless of the format.
OSHA's use of voluntary guidelines (another information strategy), as opposed to mandated rules, dismisses the underlying potential conflict of interest between business needs and individuals' needs for health and safety. Before OSHA, the costs of dangerous workplaces had been avoided by industry. The expense of occupational illness and injury was largely externalized to Social Security, disability, workers' compensation, individual worker suffering, or to society. For as much as regulatory requirements and the risk of fines have moved occupational health concerns onto the business balance sheet, voluntary guidelines, without mandatory compliance, may be empty.
Performance standards, which allow firms discretion in choosing how to comply with the rule, may fall short in achieving the ultimate goal (McNeely, 1990) . Companies with limited resources may choose ineffective methods just to meet the letter of the law; Also of note, without specification criteria in these rules, some companies and unions feel unable to determine whether they are in compliance. Interestingly, compliance directives, written for OSHA field inspectors, resort to criteria for exactly this reason.
Generic standards and consensus building techniques promise to expedite the rule making process and provide more regulatory coverage. However, the stringency of standards may suffer in deference to agreement and cooperation among interested parties. Ultimately, this may be a fair trade off given the alternative.
Apart from the efforts to reduce rule making problems, will OSHA be helped by the changes in the enforcement program? Specifically, will improvements in sanctions, recordkeeping, and targeted inspections make a difference?
Increased penalties may have little impact if history is any lesson. Many fines are whittled down as a concession in getting offenders to make immediate safety improvements. Additionally, the OSHRC often negates sanctions and reduces fines. Before new maximum penalties were set, OSHA tried to get around the fine limit by imposing maximum penalties per incident, versus per inspection. This megafine policy was criticized for its lack of thrust in implementation, as most fines were drastically reduced anyway (Ansberry, C. "OSHA criticized by safety group on megafine policy." Wall Street Journal, June 26,1989, A3).
While the SEP helps to focus attention on workplaces that need it most, the program does not increase the overall chance of an audit for any one firm. In some cases, if resources are pulled in one direction, the chance of a general inspection actually decreases since inspections are restricted by the size of OSHA's compliance force. Even though the agency requested increased funding for enforcement activities in the 1992 budget, up $10 million from fiscal year 1991, this increase will not add enforcement personnel (ProHealth Alert, 1991a) .
The establishment of record keeping functions at OSHA will provide better control of the data, and ultimately, improve compliance programs. Yet the revisions do not correct two basic flaws in the data (McNeely, 1991) . First, incidence rates, reported in the BLS Survey, have not been corroborated at the establishment level. The BLS survey, the basis of occupational safety and health information, is dependent on voluntary reporting by employers. To gain their cooperation, the surveys are confidential. Consequently, the validity of the information cannot be determined.
Important to this discussion is a notation about the final use of this data: to establish norms for industry and to assign priorities to inspections. Because of this, a more careful validation process is desirable. Corroboration of the data through random auditing is justified in light of reported widespread inaccuracies of company records (Eisenburg, 1988; National Academy of Sciences, 1987; Ruser, 1988; U.S. Congress, 1985; U.S. Department of Labor, 1987) .
The second problem with recordkeeping is the difficulty monitoring health problems. Since records focus on injury and disease outcomes, they miss disease in progress, or disease in disguise. Because of the difficulty in establishing the prevalence of occupational disease, NIOSH has created a Sentinel Health Events Notification System (Baker, 1989) .* OSHA has not yet addressed the problem.
In the future, multiple changes in regulatory strategy may help OSHA to more effectively administer its change. Meanwhile, political, social, and economic forces will continually influence the direction of change. For example, the death of95 workers "Sentine! health events relate hazards in the workplace to symptoms and signs, which would otherwise remain undiagnosed because of the remoteness ofthe circumstances.
at the Imperial Food Products Fire on September 3, 1991 in North Carolina drew renewed attention to federal OSHA's oversight of state enforcement programs (National Safe Workplace Institute, October 1991, Vol. 4, No. 10, pp. 1-2) . In addition, OSHA reform bills, calling for major overhaul of the rule-making process, mandatory health and safety committees, worker training, worker protection in refusal to perform unsafe work, and criminal penalties for willful violations await both House and Senate Confirmation this year (S. 1622, H.R. 3160).
